Russia Determined to Take Over Moldova or Break It (Part Two)

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s agenda in Moldova is an extension of Moscow’s war in Ukraine and its policy to re-expand into the intermediate zone between Russia and the West.
• The Kremlin’s top priority is to derail Moldova’s candidacy for EU membership by replacing the current government with one that is obedient to Russia.
• The outcome of Russia’s plans for Moldova largely depends on the country’s resilience and Ukraine blocking Russia’s military advance toward Odesa.

(Part One)

The Kremlin plans to use Moldova’s upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in October 2024 and July 2025, respectively, as back-to-back opportunities to replace the country’s Western-oriented leadership with one obedient to Russia. To that end, the Kremlin has initiated the Pobeda/Victory bloc of Russophile parties and groups (see EDM, April 25). Its task is to destabilize Moldova and prevent incumbent authorities from being reelected. Russian state media have recently increased the volume and virulence of their attacks on the Moldovan government to unprecedented levels, consistent with preparations for a regime-change effort.

Russia’s agenda in Moldova is part of its general policy to regain control over the independent states in the gray zone between the institutional West and Russia. This policy became manifest, at the latest, during the prelude to the all-out invasion of Ukraine. The policy is tailored to each target country. Russia’s goal in Belarus is to firmly subordinate a previously recalcitrant government inclined toward de-facto nonalignment. In Ukraine, the goals of war are to amputate the country territorially and damage the remainder to the extent of disabling it from integrating with the main Western institutions.

The Kremlin’s objectives toward Moldova are, in part, correlated with those in Ukraine, namely: opening an overland corridor to Odesa and onward to Moldova as a maximal military objective; subtracting Moldova from the pro-Ukraine coalition by political means through regime change in Chisinau; and derailing Moldova’s candidacy to EU membership along with Ukraine’s candidacy.

The Kremlin has set for itself the task of rolling back the military, political, and civilizational border between a re-expanded Russian sphere and the institutional West. Such rollback would severely destabilize the European Union’s and North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern neighborhood and increase Russia’s capacity to threaten their member states. In Moldova’s case, a Russian-orchestrated regime change could bring a panoply of hybrid threats onto the borders of Romania, with aggravated consequences if combined with a Russian military corridor to Ukraine’s Odesa region. Based, in part, on the above considerations, Moldova’s new national security strategy designates Russia as the existential threat to the country and its European orientation (see EDM, October 13, 16, 2023).

As seen from the Kremlin’s perspective, Moldova is rapidly extricating from Russia’s orbit—a process that must be turned back before the loss to Russia becomes irreversible. The factors driving that process include:

•  The current Moldovan leadership are the first-ever to fully commit to the Western orientation, be personally incorruptible, control the presidency, parliament, and government, and be immune to factionalism.
• Moldova has almost completely reoriented its foreign trade toward EU markets. Moldova’s EU candidacy status was conferred by Brussels on avowedly geopolitical considerations, albeit conditional on meeting EU membership criteria, with 2030 as the target date for accession.
• Moldova no longer procures Russian natural gas to supply the government-controlled territory since 2023, depriving Russia of a major lever of influence.
• Chisinau has blocked the access of Russian propaganda channels to Moldova and taken multiple local pro-Kremlin media outlets off the air.
• Romania (in its capacity as an EU member) looks set to win the undeclared contest against Russia for economic, political, cultural, and ecclesiastical influence in Moldova. “Moldovanism” (local particularism, long promoted by Russia) is losing ground to “Romanianism” (a Russian bête noire).
• Transnistria’s leadership (largely representing the Sheriff business conglomerate), heavily dependent on trade with the European Union through Moldova, is no longer fully obedient to Russia and not endorsing Russia’s war against Ukraine. Instead, Tiraspol is maneuvering between Russia, Ukraine, the European Union, and Moldova. With Ukraine isolating Transnistria from Russia, the Russian troops in Transnistria can no longer be supplied or rotated and are visibly degrading. Russia can be expected to change Transnistria’s current leadership in the event of a military breakthrough to Odesa.

To reverse those trends, Russia would need a full-fledged regime change in Moldova, using the Pobeda/Victory bloc of Russophile parties. Its proximate task is to destabilize the country, but it would need a broader political base to gain power. In that event, the Kremlin is likely to “federalize” Moldova into several units the size of cantons (see Part One).

This project falls within the broad portfolio of Sergei Kirienko, first deputy head of Russia’s presidential administration (see EDM, March 20). A regime-change agenda means Russia is advancing from limited to unlimited objectives in Moldova. The Kremlin’s objectives had, for nearly three decades, been limited to:

• Maintaining firm control over Transnistria;
• Perpetuating Moldova’s neutrality between Russia and the West; ruling out any serious cooperation between Moldova and NATO;
• Blocking close relations between Moldova and Romania;
• Guaranteeing Russian influence on Moldova via coalition governments in which Russophile politicians held a share of power.

Those limited Russian goals no longer apply to Moldova. The Kremlin regards Moldova’s candidacy for EU membership as incompatible with the country’s neutrality and looks determined to derail that candidacy through regime change. Russia probably calculates that its all-out invasion of Ukraine could result in Russia becoming a neighbor of Moldova. This factor, along with Moldova’s resilience, would ultimately prove decisive to the success or failure of Russia’s plans for Moldova.